This paper challenges the view that legal rights are not important in affecting whether people divorce, but it puts as much emphasis on property rights (given, for example, by the law on alimony) as on dissolution rights. The paper sets out two stylised models of marriage and examines the consequences of fuller compensation for economic sacrifices made during marriage. If the dominant economic issue in a marriage is who undertakes household tasks then a law giving fuller compensation makes divorce more likely. If the dominant issue is child custody, divorce is less likely.
What is the effect of the law on the incidence of divorce, and to what extent has the liberalisation of divorce laws over the last thirty years been responsible for the dramatic rise in marital dissolution? As some US states have begun to consider repealing the no-fault legislation of the 1970s, and as the UK continues to change its divorce laws, these questions lie at the heart of the public policy debate on the effects and desirability of divorce reform.
The economic approach to this problem starts by recognising that divorce law confers certain rights regarding marital dissolution, and it treats these as property rights in the marriage; see, for example, Becker (1991) , Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977) , and Peters (1986) . A law that allows unilateral divorce thus has a very different disposition of rights than one requiring mutual consent. But whether this makes any difference to the incidence of divorce has been challenged by the following argument. Suppose it is the husband who wishes to divorce; if his gain from divorce is large then under a mutual consent law he may be able to compensate his wife so that after a divorce they would both be better off. In effect the wife has sold her right to the marriage. Thus divorce occurs under mutual consent if there is a potential for both partners to be better off, perhaps after a suitable transfer that would form part of the divorce settlement. Under a unilateral law, if the husband's gain from divorce is small and the wife's loss is great, then she may be able to compensate her husband for not seeking a divorce. They would then both be better off than had they divorced. In effect the husband has sold his right to divorce, his compensation being some change in the way the marriage is conducted. The conclusion is that whether divorce occurs or not depends not on the law, but on the relative magnitude of the gains and losses of divorce.
Attempts to test whether divorce law affects divorce rates have produced mixed results. Using U.S. cross section data, Peters (1986 Peters ( , 1992 finds the law to be neutral. Her results have been criticised by Allen (1990 Allen ( , 1992 , mainly on the grounds that she misclassified some states as having fault-based laws. Using U.S. panel data, Zelder (1993) and Friedberg (1997) find a positive impact on divorce rates of the change to a unilateral law, whereas Smith (1997) , using U.K. time series data, finds that rules of legal procedure are important, but not the change from fault to no-fault. Overall, the empirical evidence has not been decisive. This paper looks at the theoretical basis for a relationship between divorce law and divorce incidence. I argue that there is no basis for the argument that the law necessarily has no effect on the incidence of divorce, but this does not imply that couples are missing mutually beneficial trades or that economic efficiency is compromised. I also emphasise other aspects of the law apart from the right to dissolve a marriage. How assets and resources are allocated within a marriage, and on dissolution, plays a central role in the analysis. These two branches of the law define resource rights that determine the gains and losses from divorce, and these rights are also important in determining whether divorce occurs.
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section I provides a brief discussion of how family law defines some of the property rights alluded to above, with some concrete examples, drawn mainly from Scots law.
Section II sets up a formal economic model of property rights and distribution within marriage and after divorce. In Section III two stylised models of marriage are used to analyse compensation for economic sacrifices made in marriage, and child custody. Section IV concludes.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FAMILY LAW

I.1 Dissolution Rights
Scots law has allowed divorce since the Reformation, but until 1976, it was based almost exclusively on some idea of fault: adultery, desertion, or, since 1938, cruelty, sodomy, or bestiality. Since the Divorce (Scotland) Act of 1976, the only ground for divorce has been the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, which must be proved by at least one of five "facts": adultery; unreasonable behaviour; desertion; two years separation if both partners consent to divorce; five years separation if one partner wishes to divorce. The last fact allows for unilateral divorce, the main innovation of the 1976 act.
Fault-based divorce is often held to be identical with divorce requiring mutual consent, on the grounds that in a fault-based system divorce can only happen if one spouse commits a fault (presumably in full knowledge of the possible legal consequences) and the other brings an action at law. Similarly, the absence of a fault requirement is almost invariably identified with unilateral divorce, although there is no reason why a dissolution law should be unilateral if and only if it is a no-fault law. For our purposes the important issue is whether one partner can withhold consent to a divorce or not, and this is the criterion by which the paper assesses past and prospective legal reforms, even if they are couched in the language of fault.
I.2 Resource Rights Within Marriage
The title to a physical or financial asset may belong to one or both partners, and it can be transferred from one partner to another. Who has the right to such property when a couple disagree on how it should be used depends on the current state of the law relating to marital property. This law differs between countries, and has changed over time. In Scotland before the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act of 1881, a wife had no right to her own moveable property, such as money or furniture, even if she had earned it or inherited it (an exception was so-called paraphernalia such as dresses and jewellery These examples of property law show dramatic changes in the disposition of property rights within marriage over the course of a century:
from having virtually absolute control over family resources, a husband can now be excluded from his own house.
I.3 Resource Rights at Divorce
How property, financial assets, and income are divided up at a divorce is a large and complex part of family law. In Scotland, the Family Law (Scotland) 
II. THE MODELLING FRAMEWORK
The previous section illustrated how property rights and family law have changed dramatically in the United Kingdom over the last 150 years. Broadly speaking, property rights have been transferred from men to women.
Historically this legal emancipation has been accompanied by profound changes in the political and economic status of women. In order to isolate the effect of legal changes on the incidence of divorce, I now set up a simple model of property rights and marital dissolution.
I consider a husband and wife, living together as a married couple.
They may already have children. Following Dorothy Parker, we might think of them as seven years into their marriage. Each has a certain earning capacity, which may depend on their human capital, including their previous labour market history. They have also accumulated physical and financial assets such as real estate, bank accounts, stocks, and perhaps pensions rights.
II.1 Utility under Marriage and Divorce
The combined resources of the couple define a utility possibility set, labelled M, giving the feasible levels of utility that can be achieved through marriage.
Although the position of M does not depend on the disposition of marital resource rights, to achieve some points in M may mean that one partner has to give up rights, or at least not to enforce them, and perhaps to transfer resources. Movements within M may involve not just changes in consumption expenditure, but also changes in who goes out to work, who looks after any children, who does the housework; all this will depend on the precise specification of household members' tastes, resources, assets, and employment opportunities. 
II.2 Dissolution Rights, Outside Options, and Efficiency
To analyse the decision to dissolve a marriage I rely on two principles. Firstly, I assume that dissolution rights define, for each partner, an outside option which, once exercised, determines whether the couple will separate or stay together. In the case of a unilateral dissolution law, the outside option is divorce: either partner can, without the consent of the other, force a dissolution of the marriage. With a mutual consent law, either partner can refuse to divorce and, without the consent of the other, force a continuation of the marriage. For the outside option principle to have power, it is important that exercising the option is irrevocable. This may seem a rather stark assumption, since it appears to rule out reconciliation, or changing one's mind. These are interesting problems, briefly considered in Section 4
The second principle is efficiency: no Pareto improvement is left unexploited. In the absence of informational asymmetries and transaction costs this assumption may seem quite mild, but it implies a collective rationality by the couple even if, for example, one of them has been spurned in favour of another lover.
If the outside option is exercised, the couple will reach an efficient agreement on the allocation of resources, giving a utility pair denoted (in Consider now the situation prior to the exercise of any outside option.
With a dissolution law requiring mutual consent, there is no reason for one partner, e.g. the wife, to agree to a divorce unless she gets at least m w * , her utility level if she refuses consent; similarly for the husband. Consequently 1 To use the phrase coined by Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) , the couple "bargain in the shadow of the law". Because commodity wealth is transferable between spouses at a rate of onefor-one whether they are married or divorced, the two frontiers in utility space cannot cross. Then the law on dissolution rights makes no difference to whether the couple divorce, nor do the laws on marital property and divorce settlements.
If M and D intersect, the outcome depends on both dissolution and 
To identify the point m * (the outside option under mutual consent) I first analyse the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative marriage game. If the couple do not cooperate, they spend the money that they are entitled to, but each takes no account of the effect that his/her production of the public good consistent with that taken in Ulph (1988) , Kanbur and Haddad (1994) , Lundberg and Pollack (1993), and Bergstrom (1996) , and is in contrast to the models of Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) Suppose that at the beginning of the marriage the two partners were equally well qualified, and had identical employment opportunities. During the early part of their marriage the wife withdrew from the labour market to undertake "domestic production". Suppose further that this had a damaging effect on the wife's employment prospects, so that now, seven years on, her potential wage is significantly less than the husband's. To be specific, let us 2 Although I do not provide an extensive form justification for the function f, my approach is also consistent with Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky's (1986) non-cooperative underpinning of the Nash bargaining solution, the essence of which is that the players receive m 0 while bargaining i.e. before agreement is reached.
assume that w h = 4, and w w = 1. To complete the model, assume that T = 12 and exp(ε) = 1.5 Then the frontiers B M and B D are as shown in Figure 5 .
For both marriage and divorce, let us now look at two possible stances that the law might take on property rights. Firstly, the law might specify that each partner is entitled to his or her own earned income, whatever the marital Hence the marriage survives whatever the law on dissolution. Alternatively, marital and alimony law might both specify that the wife is entitled to be compensated for her loss of earning potential and to be rewarded for the contribution she has made to any increase in her husband's earnings. However, it can readily be seen that further increases in S w would eventually place m * inside the set D. This hints at a deeper message in Figure   5 . If the husband's utility is zero, the wife would prefer divorce (u w = 36) over marriage (u w = 24). In this sense divorce favours the wife; similarly marriage favours the husband. The underlying reason is that after a divorce the husband has a much higher opportunity cost of acquiring the good x; he must
give up time at work, and suffers a greater loss of earnings. Consequently in situations where an important issue is who spends time at home, divorce is 3 Note that at c the outcome is efficient. Also, both parties are better off at c than at a. This reflects an aspect of public good games with differing production costs that has been noticed by a number of writers, especially Buchholz and Konrad (1995) . It implies that a change in the law that increases the transfer to the wife does not necessarily benefit her. more likely if the relevant property law (marital property law under mutual consent, alimony law under unilateral divorce) moves in favour of the partner with the lower wage rate.
III.3 Model 2: who gets child custody?
In this section I modify Model 1 so that it becomes a special case of a model of child custody due to Weiss and Willis (1985) . The public good is now expenditure on a single child, which benefits both parents. In a marriage, cooperative or not, the child lives with both parents, and either parent can spend on the child. After a divorce, child expenditure is still a (local) public goods, but the couple live separately. One parent has custody (e.g. the mother), and only she spends on the child. I assume that it is impossible for the father to monitor this expenditure, and so there is no mechanism whereby the mother can internalise the impact of her child expenditures on the father.
Hence B D is constrained rather than fully efficient, the constraint being one of behavioural feasibility, not resources. For a general analysis of the invariance property, see Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) .
5
With the current parameterisation, m 0 will be on the 45 0 line if 0.5Y h < Y w < 2Y h .
6
However there is no loss of utility from loss of custody per se.
so the marriage will survive, regardless of the law; (ii) if ε > log e (3/G8) M lies within D, so divorce occurs, regardless of the law; (iii) if 0 < ε < log e (3/G8) that 
IV CONCLUSION
This paper analyses how dissolution law and property law interact to determine divorce incidence. In addition to assuming that legal rights can be costlessly enforced and transferred, the paper relies on a limited number of The standard approach to a non-convex feasible set is to recognise that the payoffs are von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utilities. Consequently, a lottery over any pair of feasible points is itself feasible, so we should consider the convex hull of the union of M and D. This implies that that a couple will throw dice in order to decide whether to divorce or not! A number of authors have proposed solutions to non-convex problems which do not permit convexification; for example, Conley and Wilkie (1996) , Herrero (1989) , Kaneko (1980 ), Zhou (1996 divorced women is that they also tend to strengthen the bargaining position of married women. Since w h > w w , the R.H.S. is greater than T. Hence x w < T cannot be optimal. Suppose now x w = T, and consider the first order condition for x h . Satisfied as an equality it yields
Since w h > w w , the R.H.S. is negative so x h > 0 cannot be optimal. Thus any solution to ( 
The R.H.S. of (3) might be negative for high x j or for negative S i (partner i has to work all the time to support partner j). Similarly the R.H.S. of (3) might be greater than T. Hence the optimal choices are: 
The numerical example in Figure 5
We take w h = 4, w w = 1, T = 12, exp(e) = 1.5. Along B M , (u w ) 2 + (u h ) 2 = 576. The equations for x h and x w in a non-cooperative marriage are:
]:
If The reaction functions x i = x i (x j ) and x j = x j (x i ) are both continuous, non-increasing, bounded below by 0, and with slopes, where defined, less than one in absolute value. Hence they have a unique solution (giving a unique Nash equilibrium) in the non-negative quadrant.
Note that the reaction functions have the same functional form, so that the locus of all possible Nash equilibria, generated by varying the division of (w i + w j )T, is symmetric (in where z = 1 / 2 (w i + w j )T.
